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ABSTRACT
This article examines the deregulation of cross-broader broadcasting to
test its impact on strategies pursued by EU member states. It modifies our
understanding of regulatory competition through an institutional
explanation of the process. The European Union’s Television Without
Frontiers () Directive provided a framework for regulatory com-
petition in television broadcast markets. Despite a high level of
investment flight, member states did not automatically respond with
deregulation but were compelled to do so by the European Court of
Justice. Therefore national deregulation in this field was not a natural
response to the preference of economic actors or an objective of state
policy; it was driven by the European institutions.
The European Union’s Television Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive
facilitated a framework for deregulation in television broadcast markets.
European deregulation began in traditional utilities industries such as
telecommunications, energy and transport. Now deregulation at the
European level is moving to new areas such as broadcasting, the internet,
electronic commerce, etc, with digital technology putting an end to
spectrum scarcity. Deregulation refers to the removal of state controls on
a particular industry activity. In the case of broadcasting, as discussed in
this article, it refers to restrictions on the broadcast of content and
advertising. Deregulation is additionally meant to reduce the level of
government within a particular sector. Accordingly, Television Without
Frontiers was seen by some as an opportunity to lessen government
control over broadcasting and create a genuine competitive market. As
television signals can easily cross borders, companies can continue to
profit from home markets if they establish or move headquarters abroad
to take advantage of more favourable regulatory environments. For this
reason, the case of cross-border broadcasting is well-suited for the
observation of regulatory competition in Europe.
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In a special issue of the Journal of Public Policy on regulatory
competition, Radaelli (: ) suggested that the literature pay less
attention to ‘ elusive notions of ‘ ‘ races’’, ‘ ‘ top’’, and ‘ ‘ bottom’’, drop the
emphasis on ‘ ‘ final directions’’, and pay more attention to the actors and
processes of competition’. The articles in the issue took into account
intervening variables other than states and companies which affect
competition such as legal norms, pressure groups and trade restrictions.
This article follows this recommendation. But rather than finding that
regulatory competition is governed by a constellation of different
intervening variables, one factor is overwhelmingly important: the
actions of the European institutions.
Following Bulmer’s definition, institutions are understood to be ‘ for-
mal institutions; informal institutions and conventions; the norms and
symbols embedded in them; and policy instruments and procedures’
(: ). The article deals specifically with the formal institutions of
the European Union, namely the Commission (EC) and the Court of
Justice. Under historical institutionalism, the European institutions,
particularly the EC, are seen to make active contributions to EU
governance. Accordingly, in this article, the European Commission is
seen as proactive and cognizant in its use of regulatory competition. It
promotes regulatory competition as a tool to remove restrictions on
markets. Those who drafted TWF and other internal market initiatives
saw deregulation as leading to the establishment of a level playing field,
increased competitiveness, and the consolidation of broadcast markets.
This is clear from European Commission reports leading up to the
Directive and its  revision (Booz-Allen and Hamilton ; Sanchez-
Tabernero ; Vittet-Philip ), which echo reports from other
national and international institutions, such as International Institute of
Communications, the OECD, and UK-based think tanks (Veljanovski
; OECD a, b, ; BSAC ; Poullet ; MacLeod
; Garnham , ; Collins and Murroni ). Following
economic logic, the idea is that an optimum level of regulation would be
reached at national levels as a result of fair competition in a single
European market. The TWF Directive followed a political mandate set
out in the Single market programme to induce downward pressure on
regulation. With TWF, the European Commission produced a policy to
promote regulatory com petition which was consistently reinforced by the
European Court of Justice.
Getting the concept right: understanding regulatory competition
The literature has traditionally viewed regulatory competition to be
either a consequence of the actions of states or the preferences of
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companies. Conventional theories of the ‘ race-to-the-bottom’ or ‘ race-
to-the-top’ assume that governments will engage in regulatory competi-
tion when capital is mobile and economic actors are able to engage in
regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory arbitrage occurs when a company
chooses to relocate to a country with the most favourable regulatory
environment away from its home jurisdiction. Other states deregulate in
the attempt to re-attract investment.
Regulatory competition can lead states to either relax regulatory
standards resulting in a ‘ race to the bottom’ or increase them commenc-
ing in a ‘ race to the top’. The term race-to-the-bottom was coined by
Cary in his article on Federalism and Corporate Law (: ). Cary
observed how the small US state of Delaware was creating a favourable
regulatory environment to attract corporations in order to increase tax
revenue. What is significant about the article is that Cary drew our
attention to the fact that Delaware had adopted its objective as official
state policy. Cary quotes the Delaware Corporation Law Revision
Commission of  as stating ‘ the favourable climate which the state of
Delaware had traditionally provided for corporations has been a leading
source of revenue for the state . . . The General Assembly . . . declares
[this] to be the public policy of the State . . .’ (Cary : ). In this
case, it was the state that triggered regulation competition. The race-to-
the-top phenomenon was first observed by David Vogel in a study of
Californian environmental legislation. Vogel () argues that federal
market integration can lead to the strengthening of state product
standards due to domestic industry pressure for protection. In this case,
it is industry, not the state, which drives regulatory competition.
Rather than predicting upward or downward trends, US economists
have argued that federalism facilitates regulatory competition between
companies to aid market efficiency. Economists tend to view competition
as emerging naturally as a result of capital mobility in an integrated
market (Romano ). In this way, regulatory competition is seen to be
a natural process driven by market actors. Sun and Pelkmans ()
argued that, as EU mandates do not find the most efficient solutions to
regulatory problems and are often ineffective, regulatory competition
could be used as an alternative to harmonisation of national rules by the
EU institutions in order to achieve optimal levels of regulation. Following
this logic, the European Commission is encouraging regulatory compe-
tition as a tool for finding the ‘ optimum level’ of regulation. As Radaelli
has pointed out, the European Commission wants more not less regulatory
competition, as ‘ smarter regulation, and greater competition are instead
considered the pre-conditions for a more dynamic EU’ (: ). This, he
states, is clear from a number of Competitiveness Reports published by
the European Commission and business community in recent years.
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Reporting on the evidence: regulatory competition in the EU
A number of studies were conducted in regulatory competition in the EU.
Scharpf () and Streeck (, ), predicted a race-to-the-bottom in
regulatory standards arguing that European economic integration would
strengthen capital interests vis-a`-vis societal and labour interests. Streeck
(: –) anticipated competitive deregulation leading to a race to the
bottom in labour standards and social policy. By contrast, the early legal
literature on the EU theorised that regulatory competition could spur
mutual recognition and closer European integration (Reich ) and
even lead to a race-to-the-top (Padoa-Schioppa ).
Following these theoretical forecasts, a number of empirical studies
were published the foci of which were the functioning of integrated
markets, company preferences and the role of the state. Despite predic-
tions of negative integration by Scharpf and Streeck, most empirical
studies find little evidence of downward pressures on regulation, but point
to harmonisation or race-to-the-top movements. An issue of the Journal
of European Public Policy edited by Scharpf () tackled a number of
policy areas and found downward pressure on national regulation to be
negligible. In this issue, Vogel () found that in Europe ‘ fears about a
‘ ‘Delaware effect’’ regulatory race to the bottom are unwarranted’. In
particular, the EU played a salient role in ‘ both co-ordinating and
strengthening environmental standards among its fifteen member states’
leading to a race to the top. Eichener () found in his study of
occupational safety that the threat of downward pressure can be
overcome through European regulation in which ‘ the highest regulatory
level can be achieved’ through EU decisionmaking. Joerges and Neyer
() similarly argue that race to the bottom scenarios are overcome by
‘ administrative supranationalism’, which they see occurring in EU
comitology committees. Heritier’s conclusion is that European policy was
a mere ‘ invitation’ to revise domestic policies in regulating road haulage,
but did not compel states to deregulate. Deregulation, she argues, was a
response to domestic pressure upon which European influence was
inconsequentional. An edited book by lawyers (Bratton, McCahery,
Picciotto, and Scott ) found similar results.
Woolcock argues that there is no evidence of downward pressure due
to regulatory competition in the EU. This is because rules are set at the
European level, through Directives and Regulations, at the point when
markets are integrated. Woolcock makes the case that the existence of a
‘ blocking minority of certain key member states’ maintains regulation at
a relatively high level (: ). Further studies in the book demonstrate
the complexities in generating regulatory competition. Moffat ()
shows that regulatory competition does not occur in the private pension
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market because national regulation is very complex with a high number
of interests involved. In waste packaging, Paul () argues that EU
harmonisation through the  Directive on Packaging halted the
danger of a race to the bottom by allowing for a stricter level of regulation
in some Member States and preventing regulatory competition amongst
others. Colin Scott () argues that regulatory competition has not been
present in telecommunications policy, because the policies are either
‘ new’ or constitute re-regulation at the national level. Since telecom-
munications policy is made, in the first instance by the European
Commission, there is no opportunity for Member States to develop
distinctive regulatory regimes.
Similarly, on the phenomenon of regulatory arbitrage, Romano finds
that ‘ reincorporation costs in Europe make corporations immobile’
(: ) due to the complications of tax and human capital. In her
study, Barnard () argues that relocation in the EU is low due to the
dissimilarity in European legal systems, which have a greater bearing
on a company’s choice than regulation. McCahery and Vermeulen
() argue that arbitrage is little changed since the EU was estab-
lished because the Member states ‘were determined to prevent the
‘ ‘Delaware-effect’’ ’.
Contrary to the studies outlined above, this article finds that both
downward pressure on and regulatory arbitrage in broadcasting
markets are high. This pressure is not driven by the state or industry but
by the actions of the European institutions. There is little evidence of
harmonization or a race to the top in EU broadcasting regulation.
Rather, the political mandate of the European institutions is one of
deregulation. It is precisely those rules made through Directives and
Regulations, which are the subject of competition.
Television Without Frontiers as a case study
The  European Union Television Without Frontiers (TWF)
Directive provided a framework for capital mobility within the EU for
firms which were previously confined to national markets – television
broadcasters. The goal was chiefly to encourage (via deregulation) the
exploitation of new technologies (initially cable and satellite broadcasting)
and create strong European companies able to compete globally. By
defining television signals as services which required free movement
within the internal market, TWF paved the way for cross-border
transmission via satellite and cable. According to TWF, a broadcaster
could only be regulated by the country of origin and not by the country
of reception. This principle was derived from European Court of Justice
(ECJ) rulings in the s and s.
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The TWF Directive created the preconditions for market-driven
regulatory competition between EU Member States. But how did states
react? In light of the literature on regulatory competition, this section
discusses () whether states engage in regulatory competition when an
internal market is created () whether states are reacting to preferences of
economic actors when deregulating () whether broadcasting companies
respond to deregulation by relocating their headquarters () whether
further states enter the game when faced with regulatory competition and
() whether a perception of a ‘ race to the bottom’ has triggered
harmonisation in the form of EU regulation or regulatory cooperation
between states outside the EU legal framework.
In the presence of near ideal pre-conditions for aggressive regulatory
competition, only two EU Member States, the UK and Luxembourg
responded with deregulation. These two states did not (initially) deregu-
late to attract companies from abroad, but rather to promote domestic
companies which had close political ties to domestic governments. Since
the TWF Directive’s enactment, ‘ investment flight’ towards these two
jurisdictions is shown to be high. This is directly linked to the attractive-
ness of those states with reduced regulatory requirements. This adheres
to the original theory on regulatory arbitrage. Hence, in contrast to
existing empirical studies in other sectors, this article finds that there is a
relatively high degree of company relocation in the EU.
However, regulatory arbitrage did not drive regulatory competition
beyond the UK and Luxembourg. Member States have resisted down-
ward pressures on regulation. However, it is argued, deregulation and
regulatory competition is a core objective of the European institutions.
The key finding is that additional Member States were compelled to
deregulate following a series of European Court of Justice Decisions
which reinforced competitive pressures on domestic legislations. The
dismantling of national restrictions was sustained through the ECJ rulings
in the s and s which reinforced the TWF principle that
broadcasting be governed by the laws stemming from the state of
transmission and not the state of reception. Those rules named in the
directive are those singled out for deregulatory competition. National
deregulation was not a natural response to the preference of economic
actors, but governed by the EU institutions.
Regulatory instruments subject to European competition
Before , broadcasting policy was exclusively the domain of the
Member State. In many states, public service broadcasters held national
monopolies. In those states with emerging private markets, spectrum
scarcity restricted the market to a small number of broadcasters which
 Alison J. Harcourt
were strictly regulated. Regulatory instruments were similar throughout
Western European states based on principles discussed and established
within the Council of Europe. Regulatory instruments such as rules on
advertising, content and the protection of minors, were designed to
protect the public interest. The regulation of television was seen to aid
the functioning of a democratic system through the guarantee of a
‘ plurality of voices.’ The latter has been the chief rationale for the
maintenance of a public service broadcaster (PSB) which is meant to
contribute to the quality of public discourse, promote societal integration,
and emphasise news and education, as opposed to entertainment
(Voltmer ).
New technologies, satellite and cable in the s and digital in the
s, were meant to put an end to spectrum scarcity. This was seen as
an opportunity by some in the European Commission to break political
heavy-handedness in broadcasting and create a genuine competitive
market. However, European governments clung to traditional modes of
control when defining satellite and digital policies. Even though they
agreed upon a Directive facilitating cross-border broadcasting, national
governments did not relinquish media/cultural policy to the European
level. The EC was unable to harmonise rules on broadcasting content as
it was viewed to be encroaching on ‘public interest’ and ‘ cultural’
policies (exempt by subsidiarity).
Member states have an extensive menu of national regulatory instru-
ments used to protect both the public interest and national culture in
broadcasting. These fall broadly under the following categories: restric-
tions on media ownership, the number of licences issued to national
broadcasters, rules on media content, percentage requirements for news
and documentary programming, minimum quotas for European and
national content, time devoted to minority audience programming, right
of reply rules, prohibition of pornography, limitation of television
violence, prohibition of incitement to racial hatred, youth protection,
copyright, advertising standards, advertising time, advertising breaks,
and programme sponsorship rules.
Examples of such content rules are: watersheds (i.e. after  p.m.) for the
showing of programming containing violence and sexual behaviour, rules
on the portrayal of sexual conduct, crime reporting, rules and limitations
on ‘phone-in’ programmes, chatshows, religious programming, rules on
the use of hidden microphones, to name a few. TWF did not handle
politically sensitive areas such as PSB funding, media ownership or the
licensing of private broadcasters.
But a number of rules were made under TWF. According to the 
version of the Directive, these are namely: the majority proportion of
transmission time should be reserved for European works (originating
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from Member States) excluding the time appointed to news, sports
events, games, advertising, teletext services and teleshopping;  per cent
of transmission time or alternatively  per cent of programming budget
should be reserved for European works created by producers who are
independent of broadcasters; interruption of films by advertising should
be limited to once every  minutes; the exclusion of advertising during
news, current affairs programmes, documentaries, religious programmes
and children’s programmes (when the duration is less than  minutes);
the prohibition of advertising cigarettes, and other tobacco products;
prescription medicines, and medical treatment; the limitation of adver-
tising time to  per cent of the daily transmission time and  per cent
within a given clock hour; the protection of minors; and prohibition of
incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality.
These are precisely the rules which have been subject to downward
pressure. By naming them in the Directive, the European Commission
opened them to regulatory competition. This was ensured by rulings of
the Court of Justice.
In order to promote cross-border transmission, the Directive contained
the typical ‘ single market’ clause that stipulated that a broadcasting
company may only be regulated in the country of transmission, not
reception. The reasoning behind this was that a company would not be
subject to many different laws in countries of reception and would only
have to deal with one regulatory authority. It was this clause that
triggered regulatory arbitrage as it rendered national law ineffective
vis-a`-vis foreign broadcasts. It had the consequence of companies moving
their headquarters abroad to Member States with less restrictions to
avoid national media regulation. In practice, national laws covered in
TWF were the most prone to downward pressure.
Luxembourg: from zero-regulation to a tailor-made regime for foreign companies
Regulatory competition theory assumes that states relax legislation
in order to attract companies from abroad. The cases of UK and
Luxembourg do not confirm this assumption as both states deregulated in
favour of domestic economic actors. The advent of satellite broadcasting
simply increased the domestic pressure on governments to deregulate.
Although small in population and size (and hence media market),
Luxembourg was allocated an equal number of satellite frequencies as
the rest of Europe. As Luxembourg did not have a PSB, the government
granted its entire allocation of satellite frequencies to the Astra satellite in
 with which Europe´en des Satellites (SES), Europe’s first partly
privately-owned satellite television system, was created (the government
retained  per cent). At the same time, implementation of the TWF
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Directive required that a media law be introduced in Luxembourg.
Up until , Luxembourg had no media law to speak of. When
Luxembourg introduced its Electronic Media Law of  July , it
introduced restrictions on media markets for the first time. These rules
were limited to the domestic market only and did not apply to television
or radio broadcast to other Member States (i.e. from the Astra satellite).
Luxembourg therefore set up a different regulatory regime for satellite
companies broadcasting abroad. This enabled Luxembourg to retain
control over its domestic market while allowing companies based in
Luxembourg to broadcast abroad with very few restrictions.
This policy sparked regulatory arbitrage. As the  TWF Directive
stipulates that a broadcaster can only be regulated by the country of
origin and not by the country of reception, a number of foreign
companies were able to bypass their national legislators by transmitting
from Luxembourg using the Astra satellite. Companies established
themselves in Luxembourg to broadcast to other Member States (some to
circumvent national legislations, some simply due to domestic spectrum
scarcity). Indeed, Astra has proved the most popular satellite for
European broadcasters, hosting both analogue and digital channels
which broadcast in almost all EU Member States, and an increasing
number of non-EU states. Chalaby notes that Astra hosts over 
television and radio channels to  million European households (: ).
Significantly, large national players in France (Canalsatellite),
Germany (DF), the Netherlands (NetHold), Spain (Sogecable) and the
UK (BSkyB) chose to launch satellite platforms from Luxembourg. The
Luxembourg company CLT (now controlled by Bertelsmann) developed
into a multi-national company active in French, Belgian, Dutch,
German, UK, Spanish and Eastern European television and radio
markets via the Astra satellite. CLT owns the channels RTL- and
RTL- which target the Netherlands and RTL which targets France
and Switzerland. Astra hosts digital platforms for Canal Plus in the
French, Polish, Spanish and Dutch markets and provides further capacity
for Kirch, ARD, ZDF, and ORF-SRG. NetHold (which is based in
Amsterdam) transmits too much of northern Europe (e.g. FilmNet
broadcasts to Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and
Finland). A number of single stations are hosted on Astra which broadcast
to most of Europe. Significantly, many stations contain content which is
strictly regulated at national levels (e.g. chatshow channels, music
channels, religious stations, fashion channels, regional channels and
‘ adult film’ channels). The policy has proved lucrative for Luxembourg.
The broadcasting sector quickly became a prominent sector of the
Luxembourg economy and the biggest tax contributor from 
onwards.
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United Kingdom: domestic pressure and regulatory arbitrage
Did Luxembourg’s policy trigger regulatory competition in Europe? The
availability of channel capacity and transnational transmission from
Luxembourg certainly had its effect on the evolution of media regulation
in other Member States. However, other Member States did not counter
with deregulation to re-attract investment from abroad. In the UK,
domestic factors were keys to regulatory change. The UK case arose out
of a domestic political dispute over media ownership. Prime Minister
Thatcher supported the expansion of Murdoch’s News International in
both press and broadcasting markets (for detail on Murdoch’s press
expansion see Doyle ; Hooper ). Press expansion was dependent
upon ministerial decision, so this was easily attained. However, allowing
expansion in the broadcasting market meant a change to national
broadcasting law, which required parliamentary approval. This was
more politically challenging. There were two prime legal obstacles for
Murdoch. British law forbade foreign ownership of broadcasters and
contained strict cross-ownership rules (i.e. Murdoch had extensive press
interests, so could not own broadcasters outright). The Conservative
government did not want to relax cross-media ownership limits at the
national level, as that would have meant allowing expansion by the
(Labour-supporting) Mirror Group in broadcasting.
The implementation of TWF in  provided the Thatcher govern-
ment with a window of opportunity. The enactment of the  UK
Broadcasting Act added requirements for satellite licences. Section  of
the  Broadcasting Act applied a diﬀerent regulatory regime to
non-domestic satellite services as that applicable to domestic satellite
services. Companies whose headquarters were in the UK but broadcast-
ing from abroad (i.e. Sky) were only required to obtain a non-domestic
satellite licence. Non-domestic satellite licences were exempt from both
foreign ownership and cross-media ownership rules and a whole host of
other domestic rules.
At the national level, this meant that Sky did not have to respect
domestic rules, even, as Lord David Puttnam put it, its ‘ programmes
were put together in West London and went up from a BT uplink in
East London; because for a millisecond it hit a foreign piece of metal
before being bounced back down to Britain, it qualified as a ‘non-
domestic’ broadcaster – thereby not subject to any of the rules and
regulations which BSB laboured under’ (Puttnam ). By contrast, the
BSB company broadcasting from the UK satellite Marco Polo, was
subject to the UK’s stricter domestic regulation. This rendered BSB less
competitive and subject to take-over – by Sky with which BSkyB was
formed.
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At the European level, the provision triggered regulatory arbitrage.
Not only was BSkyB exempt from national regulation, but so of course
was every other company granted a non-domestic satellite licence by the
UK. In practice, the  Broadcasting Act allowed the UK to issue
licences to any company that wanted to broadcast abroad via satellite.
The UK was highly effective in attracting foreign media investment. As
the prerequisite to obtaining a UK satellite licence is that a company’s
headquarters need to be UK-based, a large number of companies set
up shop in the UK. By the end of ,  non-domestic satellite
licences were issued by the UK regulatory authority, the ITC. By ,
 satellite licences had been issued. Hence, in contrast to the studies
by Barnard () and McCahery and Vermeulen () regulatory
arbitrage has clearly been at work in this case.
The policy became controversial for obvious reasons particularly as the
ITC provided non-domestic satellite licences to a number of broadcasters
which had been denied licences in their home countries. In particular, a
number of US groups (e.g. UPC and CME) with multichannel packages
applied for UK licences in order to gain a foothold in the European
market. Many companies evaded national advertising restrictions in this
way. For example, satellite channels were sponsoring alcohol and
tobacco products in France, bypassing advertising rules in Germany, and
inserting advertising spots into children’s programming hours in Sweden
and Norway – contrary to those states’ broadcasting rules. In addition to
national rules, many UK-based satellite channels did not observe TWF
advertising rules. Williams () observed that over  European media
companies broadcasting from the UK did not observe TWF provisions
on advertising in .
Most satellite channels tend to be pan-European. There are single-
language pan-European channels e.g. Arte, BBC World, BBC Prime, BVN,
CNN International, MTV Europe, TV Europe, sat, TV Europe, and VH-.
For example, BBC World broadcasts across Europe in English, TV
Europe broadcasts in French and Arte broadcasts in both French and
German. Then there are pan-European channels with distinct language
versions – something that is now possible with digital technology – e.g.
Discovery Channel, Discovery Networks Europe (Discovery Channel, Animal Planet
Europe, etc), Euronews, Eurosport, Eurosport News, National Geographic, Turner
Broadcasting (TCM, Cartoon Network), Fox (Fox Kids), Hallmark (Hallmark
Channel), TV, UPC/chellomedia (Club, Reality TV, Romantica) and
Viacom (MTV, Nickelodeon). This is the format that most US channels use
to broadcast channels from the UK to the rest of Europe. Interestingly,
they have advertising windows dedicated to specific national markets. For
example, children watching Lilo and Stitch on the Disney Channel in
France will watch advertising targeted towards the French market,
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whereas children watching the same programme in Germany will see a
different commercial break. Then there are channels broadcasting in one
language, but which divide advertising for different national markets. For
example, when Sky News breaks for advertising, it shows different
commercials in Ireland than it does in the UK. Pro shows different
advertising in Germany as it does in Austria. SAT, RTL, Pro and
Kabel show different advertising in Switzerland and Austria than they
do in Germany. Then there are channels established outside Europe but
relayed through European satellites like TV Globo International and
HBN Herbalife Broadcasting Network (Europe). Finally, there are those
channels which have physically relocated their headquarters to the UK,
many to bypass national restrictions. For example, it is clear that the
Swedish channels TV, + , and Kanal  were licenced in the UK to
bypass Scandinavian advertising laws.
Under its rules, the UK is able to license channels broadcasting
from any satellite. An increasing number of satellites have ‘European’
footprints (Astra, Hot Bird, EuroBird, Sirius, Thor/Intelsat, W,
AtlanticBird). At a rough count, this author estimated in , that that
these satellites hosted circa  chat channels,  teleshopping channels,
 music channels,  religious stations,  fashion stations, and 
(continuous broadcast) ‘ adult film’ channels (this does not count those
channels that include ‘ adult content’ as a part of daily programming).
Since , there have no longer been ‘non-domestic satellite licences’
in the UK, as such, merely ‘ satellite licences’. However, the UK
continues to apply different regulatory regimes to satellite broadcasters
than to terrestrial broadcasters. Hence, only terrestrial broadcasters are
subject to stricter content requirements. Deregulation continued in the
UK most recently with the  Communications Act which opened the
whole of the UK market to foreign owners (including non-EU owners).
UK deregulation, particularly of ownership rules, was mostly the result of
domestic lobbying. The latest deregulatory move reflects, again, an
attempt to solve a domestic problem. By allowing non-EU players into
the market under the Communications Act, the UK sought to attract
outside investment to rescue a failed venture (the bankrupt ITV
companies) in digital broadcasting, thereby presenting potential com-
petition to the digital monopoly BSkyB. Deregulation of foreign owner-
ship applies to terrestrial and digital services. There are already quite a
number of US players in British press and cable markets (Collins ).
This deregulatory move is expected to attract further investment from
abroad. Even though each deregulatory move was the result of domestic
pressures, the effect upon regulatory arbitrage is clear. The satellite
policies of the UK and Luxembourg had a knock-on effect for the rest of
Europe.
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Entering ECJ action
The existence of light-touch regulatory regimes in the UK and
Luxembourg did not automatically lead to a removal of rules in other
Member States. This was brought about through challenges to national
policies brought to the European Court of Justice. Rather than recog-
nising arguments of ‘ cultural policy’ (an area protected by subsidiarity),
the Court mandated further deregulation in Member States through a
series of rulings. In its rulings, the Court legitimised the right of
broadcasting companies to move abroad to take advantage of less
restrictive regulatory frameworks. The Court proclaimed that the rules
named in the TWF were subject to deregulation. Therewith, this
European institution reinforced regulatory competition.
The initial ECJ cases dealing with cross border broadcasting came
before TWF. The  Sacchi case declared that broadcasting be
considered a tradable service. Therewith the Court claimed the sector as
within jurisdiction of the Treaty of Rome. The  Debauve case
ensured that broadcasting from one Member State to another was legal.
The European Court of Justice established that any discrimination by a
Member State against a broadcasting signal due to national origin cannot
be justified under the European Treaties. The ruling related to three
French cable broadcasters which were transmitting advertising to cable
subscribers in Belgium. Belgian legislation at the time banned advertis-
ing, but French law did not. The Court established that the companies
transmitting from abroad were to heed domestic legislation, but were not
liable to laws in countries of reception.
Based precisely upon these two ECJ rulings the EU passed its Television
Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive in . From this time onwards, there
was a dramatic increase in ECJ court cases dealing with cross-border
broadcasting. In every case wherein Member States claimed cross-border
broadcasters violated domestic media rules, the ECJ ruled against them.
Member States argued that media policy (as cultural policy) was a
domain belonging exclusively to the Member State. The Court did not
recognise this even following the introduction of subsidiarity in the 
Maastricht Treaty.
The first of these cases was the Commission of the European Communities v
Kingdom of the Netherlands case of . When the first case was brought
to the ECJ in , Dutch cable regulation, stipulated that ‘ broadcasters
in foreign countries were prohibited from broadcasting programmes with
Dutch advertisements to the Dutch audience’ (Korthals Altes : ).
The Court’s decision overrode Dutch cable regulation, stating that:
Even if such a restriction forms part of a cultural policy intended to safeguard the
freedom of expression of the various social, cultural, religious and philosophical
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components of society by ensuring the survival of an undertaking which provides
them with technical resources, it goes beyond the objective pursued, since
pluralism in the audio-visual sector of a Member State cannot be affected in any
way by allowing the national bodies operating in that sector to make use of
providers of services established in other Member States.
Television Without Frontiers rendered Dutch regulation ineffective
against broadcast from abroad, even those in the Dutch language. At
present, over forty per cent of audience share in the Netherlands comes
from foreign broadcasts, a large proportion of which goes to the
Luxembourg-based channels, RTL  and  (Stichting KijkOnderzoek
). The Netherlands was subsequently required to make changes to its
national law which provoked a greater sector deregulation than had been
envisioned by the Dutch authorities.
The next cross-border case came in , when the ECJ ruled against
the Belgian state in European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium. The Court
decided that Belgium had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles ,
,  and  of the EEC Treaty on four counts: by prohibiting cable
programmes from other Member States where the programme was
not in the language stipulated by Belgian law; by subjecting cable
commercial broadcasters from other Member States to prior authoris-
ation, to which conditions might have been attached; by reserving  per
cent of the capital of the Flemish commercial broadcaster for publishers
of Dutch-language daily and weekly newspapers; and by compelling
commercial broadcasters to constitute a compulsory part of their
programming to cultural interest. The ruling states the ‘Belgian govern-
ment, however, relies upon cultural policy objectives to justify the
legislation in question, namely the maintenance of pluralism [. . .] Those
arguments cannot be accepted.’ Accordingly, the Court compelled
Belgium to deregulate in order to allow cross-border transmission.
As stated, a number of companies have located headquarters to the
UK to bypass national rules. Some of these were challenged in the
European Court of Justice. In the s, Belgian law stipulated that
the Flemish Executive could only licence one commercial television
broadcaster at a time. In  this licence was granted to Vlaamse
Televisie Maatschappij NV (‘VTM’) to broadcast for a term of  years.
Under the same provisions, only one broadcaster (radio or television)
for the Flemish Community could be licensed to transmit advertising.
This licence was also issued to VTM for a term of  years in .
Therewith VTM held a legal monopoly in commercial television and
television advertising in Flanders. In , the Scandinavian Broadcast-
ing SA (registered in Luxembourg) established the Flemish channel VT.
VT secured a non-domestic satellite service licence from the UK
permitting it to broadcast to Flanders under UK regulation (pertaining to
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non-domestic satellite broadcasts) from Luxembourg. The Flemish
Minister of Culture and Brussels Aﬀairs reacted by prohibiting the transmis-
sion of VT to Flanders from  January  through a declaration of
the Raad van State (State Council). The case was brought to the ECJ,
which, as in similar cases, decided against the Flemish Minister for
Culture and ruled that the broadcast of VT to Flanders was legitimate.
Following the ruling, the State Council lifted its prohibition on cable
retransmission of VT. In , the channel was eventually licensed by
the Flemish Executive following a change in national rules.
In a similar case, the Court ruled against Belgium a second time. The
UK had this time issued one of its non-domestic satellite licences to
Turner International which planned to broadcast satellite channels via
cable from Germany to Brussels. As there was no legislation at that time
governing cable television in Brussels, a Royal Decree was issued the day
before the agreement (on  September ) prohibiting the channels
‘TNT’ and ‘Cartoon Network.’ Turner International challenged the
Decree in a Belgian Court and won the right to broadcast. However, the
Belgian state had meanwhile begun a separate case against Paul Denuit,
the managing director of Coditel cable, for ignoring the Royal Decree of
 September . The Tribunal de Premie`re Instance referred the case
to the ECJ which ruled in favour of Denuit in . The interesting
thing about this case is that the Belgium authority argued that TNT was
violating the quota rules of the TWF Directive. The Court avoided a
ruling on quota rules stating instead that Belgium had a right to pursue
action against the UK following procedural rules. However, the core
ruling referred only to the right of the company to broadcast to Belgium
from the UK – the fact that broadcast was in French and aimed directly
at Belgian audiences was inconsequential.
In , the Court ruled against the Swedish authority, the Konsumen-
tombudsmannen. In a decision on two joint cases KO v. De Agostini and
TVShop, the Court interpreted European advertising rules. Sweden has
strict rules on advertising. It prohibits teleshopping and the targeting of
advertising to children under the age of . The first Agostini case dealt
with children’s advertising. The Italian group De Agostini, which transmits
the channels TV to Denmark, Sweden and Norway and TV to Sweden
via satellite, is licensed in the UK. On channel TV it advertised its
children’s magazine ‘Everything about Dinosaurs’ to Sweden. The
magazine was printed in Italy and distributed in several languages across
Europe. Each issue of the magazine was accompanied with a constituent
part of a model dinosaur. The Swedish consumer’s ombudsman, the
Konsumentombudsmannen (KO), brought the case to the Marknadsdomstol
(Swedish Market Court) claiming that advertising to children contra-
vened Article  of the Swedish Broadcasting Act. In the second case, the
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company TVShop Europe was broadcasting teleshopping and ‘ info-
mercials’ for skincare products and detergent on TV and the Home-
shopping Channel to Sweden. The KO accused TV of misleading
advertising under Sweden’s Marketing Practices Law. The
Marknadsdomstol referred both cases to the ECJ querying whether such
advertising could be restricted under the rules on advertising and the
protection of minors in the  TWF Directive.
In both cases, the European Court of Justice ruled that Sweden was in
its rights to apply more stringent rules on advertising but it could only
apply them to domestic broadcasters – and not to those broadcasting from other
Member States. The KO argued that the channels should be considered
‘Swedish’ because ‘ the announcers all speak Swedish, . . . the advertise-
ments are exclusively for the Swedish market given the language in which
they are prepared and the products which are marketed.’ However, the
Court found this position untenable. The ruling concentrated on the
importance of establishment. As the companies had been established in
the UK, they were therefore considered ‘British’ governed by British
media regulation. This ruling is important because the Court opened up
rules on protection of minors to regulatory competition. Sweden was
prohibited from applying Article  to TV broadcasts precisely because
the protection of minors was covered under the TWF Directive and
therefore subject to competition rules. Hence, it is exactly those provi-
sions named under the Directive, such as the protection of minors, which
are subject to competition. The Directive does not ensure the protection
of minors as such – nor does it permit Member States to apply their own
rules – it simply opens up the possibility for competition of rules on the
protection of minors. The ruling is particularly salient considering
OFCOM’s recent efforts to restrict junk-food advertising to children in
the UK.
The ECJ ruled similarly in a case on alcohol advertising in . In
Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products
Aktiebolag (GIP), the ECJ ruled against the Swedish law banning alcohol
advertising stating that ‘ a ban which extends to commercial advertisings
in periodicals a significant part of whose subject-matter is lawfully
devoted to alcoholic beverages is in principle unnecessary and ineffective
in that regard, and thus incapable of such justification’. The Advertising
Information Group welcomed the EC’s ruling and staged that ‘The
Single Market for advertising has yet to be created, as too many national
bans or restrictions continue to exist, as DG MARKT rightly noted in its
‘ ‘Communication on an Internal Market Strategy for Services’’, in
January ’ (http://www.aig.org/). This is significant considering the
EC’s challenge to France’s ‘Loi Evin’ law. All of these rulings have
consequences for the revision of the TWF Directive (renamed the
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Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AMSD) which is ongoing at the
time of writing.
In another  case, the ECJ took a stab at national advertising
restrictions, this time in Italy. Although this was not a cross-border case,
it shows how the European institutions promoted deregulation at the
national level. In , the Italian Ministry for Post and Telecommuni-
cations challenged Italian broadcasters on ‘ telepromozione’ which it
claimed violated Television Without Frontiers rules on advertising.
‘Telepromozione’ is advertising conducted within a television pro-
gramme by the television announcers thereby overstepping legal adver-
tising limits (within the clock hour). Italy is notorious for innovative
advertising techniques and the Italian regulatory authorities had for some
time been trying to get a grip on national evasion of both domestic and
European advertising restrictions. However, rather than ruling in favour
of the Italian regulatory authority, the European Court chose to overturn
rather than enforce, not only national rules on advertising, but even those
set out in the TWF Directive.
The RTI case dealt with the violation of TWF advertising rules by
the use of ‘ telepromozione’ by Italian broadcasters. The case was brought
by the Italian Ministry for the Post and Telecommunications against the
Italian broadcasters Reti Televisive Italiane SpA (RTI) (C-/),
Radio Torre, Rete A Srl, Vallau Italiana Promomarket Srl (C-/),
Radio Italia Solo Musica Srl and Others (C-/) and GETE Srl
(C-/). The Italian regional court of Lazio referred the case to the
European Court. The Italian Ministry argued that domestic broadcasters
were violating not only national law, but European law on advertising as
set out in the TWF Directive. The Court overruled TWF provisions with
the statement:
‘ the provision by the Community legislature for an increase in the maximum
transmission time for direct offers to the public is due to the fact that that type of
sales promotion requires more transmission time than spot advertisements,
and not to the fact that such offers present products which may be directly ordered
by telephone, mail or videotext and are intended to be delivered to viewers at
home, since the ordering of products by the viewer is a wholly separate operation
from the televised presentation with which the directive is concerned. It is
therefore normal that other forms of advertising, which also require more
time than spot advertisements, should be able to benefit from the increase
that is expressly, but not exclusively, provided for in respect of direct offers to the
public.’
In his analysis of the case, Mastroianni explains, the Court did this by
‘ equat(ing) ‘ telepromozione’ with advertising in the form of a direct offer to
the public. It held that there is no limitation on the number of times a
sponsor may be mentioned during sponsored programmes’ (: ). This
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ruling had consequences for the  revision of the TWF Directive
which loosens advertising rules accordingly.
This loosening of TWF rules was trumped only by the Court’s
overturning of the Tobacco Advertising Directive in . In Case
C-/ Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and
Council of the European Union, Directive /, which was adopted to
prevent the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products within the
EU, was annulled. Following lobbying by a number of UK and German
tobacco companies, the ECJ found that the Directive prohibited trade in
goods and services and thus was contrary to provisions in the Treaties.
Clearly, the European Court has compelled downward pressure on
national legislation in its rulings. What is interesting is the interpretation
of TWF provisions by the national regulatory authorities (NRAs).
Whereas the NRAs viewed provisions in the Directive to protect or
enhance national laws on broadcasting, the reality is that TWF simply
opened these rules to competition – this being the key aim of the
Directive. This was a political mandate of the EU institutions based upon
the Single Market project which is one of deregulation, not
harmonisation.
Perceptions of a ‘ Race to the Bottom’ and Political Mobilisation: comparative
analysis
Deregulation in the media field prompted fears of a ‘ race to the bottom’
in broadcasting standards and mobilised Member States towards regu-
latory co-operation in Europe. This began with high level political
discussion of evasion of public interest regulation presented by cross-
border broadcasting at the national level. Political mobilisation began to
emerge at the national level not only through Court action (as detailed in
the last section) but also in national attempts to fortify existing legislation.
Examples of national political mobilisation, outlined below, come from
France and the UK. It is not the purpose of this article to judge whether
governments were justified in these efforts. The approach is not norma-
tive, but aimed at understanding what effect an integrated European
market is having on a Member State’s capacity to regulate itself.
France: perceived degradation of content
In , a campaign by teachers’ unions and the press targeted the
problem of the accessibility of pornography in France. A study conducted
by Mediame´trie found French audiences now have access to 
pornography films a month via satellite. The regulatory authority
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carried out a survey and found that . per cent of boys aged  or 
had seen one or more pornographic films, and  per cent of children
under . The study also looked at content of pornography which
was found to be increasingly violent. It quoted sociological studies that
linked the present increase in sexually violent crime by teenagers (also
seen as a problem in Italy) to exposure to such content. The claim is
that adolescents reconstruct these acts. An opinion poll showed that
 per cent of French viewers were in favour of direct censorship. The
French regulatory authority (CSA) targeted satellite channels broadcast-
ing pornographic films. It drew up changes to national media law,
evoking Article . of the Television Without Frontiers Directive,
according to which broadcasts may not ‘ include any programmes which
might seriously impair the physical, mental or moral development of
minors, in particular programmes that involve pornography or gratuitous
violence.’ The CSA also proposed a modification of Article  of the
Broadcasting law of  September  to achieve an explicit ban on
programmes that involved pornography or gratuitous violence. However,
the proposals were dropped. Interviews with CSA officials revealed that if
the law were passed, media groups threatened to relocate their head-
quarters abroad to circumvent French law. The concern was less that
these groups would engage increasingly in the broadcast of adult content,
but that companies would bypass French content quota requirements.
United Kingdom: the issue of smartcards
Although the UK has been keen to encourage cross-border broadcasting
to continental Europe, it has been less open to receiving signals from
abroad. Rather than imposing a direct ban, the UK indirectly banned
transmission through the illegalisation of smartcards. Under Section 
of the Broadcasting Act  (still in force) the ITC could recommend to
the Secretary of State for Culture that a foreign channel be made the
subject of a proscription order if it is satisfied the channel repeatedly
‘ offends against good taste and decency’. A proscription order makes it
a criminal offence in the UK to sell smartcards and decoders or
subscriptions, to publish programme information or to advertise desig-
nated services. The UK banned the selling of smartcards for a number of
channels broadcasting what is termed ‘hardcore pornography’ (namely,
Red Hot Television, Red Hot Dutch, Eros TV, TV Erotica (also known
as xxxTV), Channel Bizzare, Rendezvous Channel, Satisfaction
Channel, Satisfaction Club, Television Eurotica, Rendez Vous, and
Adult X). The UK consulted both the European Commission and the
country of origin (e.g. Denmark in the case of Eurotica Rendez-Vous) to
reach ‘ amicable settlements’ before proscription orders were issued.
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European-level mobilisation
Political mobilisation reached the European level with numerous com-
plaints about cross-border broadcasting submitted to the European
institutions. One could argue that the European institutions are not deaf
to the political preferences of Member States and interest groups, but
they are limited by the Treaties of the European Union, which do not
deal with matters of public interest regulation or cultural policy. For their
part, Member States do not wish to relinquish one of the last bastions of
national policy (cultural policy) to the European Union. One could
surmise that this is the reason why race-to-the-top scenarios through EU
have not been possible. However, the more compelling case is that that
there is little political will on behalf of the European institutions to head
in this direction, as the key policy goal is deregulation and the removal
of market restrictions. For this reason, actors have had to search for
alternative ways to enable cooperation at the European level.
In a formal context, political mobilisation has led to little regulatory
cooperation. The European Parliament has been the leader in promoting
public interest goals in a number of its reports (Harcourt : –).
This led to debate at the European level which in turn has led to some
changes in European regulation. One of these changes was to the
updated  TWF directive that recognises that companies must be
regulated in the country of establishment (i.e. legitimising the UK
principle). The revised TWF also recognises the right of Member States
to challenge broadcasts from abroad in the ECJ (but it does not dictate
the outcome). Changes have also been made to the EU Treaties:
specifically the inclusion of the ‘Culture’ articles (Articles  and Article
q) in the  Treaty of Maastricht and Protocol  on public service
broadcasting in  Treaty of Amsterdam. This was followed up by the
 European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights which recom-
mends that ‘ the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic
diversity.’ These changes have been flanked by the recent UNESCO
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions (approved October ). However, the only tangible
change at the European level could come if the clause for the protection
of media pluralism in the emerging European ‘Constitution’ were
empowered. Article II- on freedom of expression and information states
that ‘The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected’. This
Article in its present state would require a unanimous vote within the
Council which is politically impossible.
Most attempts at regulatory cooperation at the European level are the
result of national efforts: the encouragement of industry self-regulation
and the promotion of co-operation and information exchange between
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national regulatory authorities and courts. This can be seen in a number
of fora, but most importantly within EPRA, a regulatory platform for
media authorities. The European Advertising Standards Alliance (EASA)
has established a complaints committee for cross-border advertising
complaints. To which extent regulatory cooperation can be attained
through these ‘ soft’ forums is debatable as soft measures are a weaker
form of governance and have not shown promise at national levels
(Prosser ).
Conclusion
This article found that the creation of an internal market in broadcasting
with an EU Directive (Television Without Frontiers) did not induce Member
States to engage in regulatory competition. Only two EU Member States,
the UK and Luxembourg responded with deregulation. They were not
reacting to capital mobility in the market, but responding to demands
from domestic firms which wished to expand into broadcasting markets
via satellite. These actors, BSkyB and CLT respectively, had close
political ties to domestic governments at that time. Therefore an
integrated market was not sufficient to produce regulatory competition.
In contrast to the empirical studies by Barnard (), McCahery and
Vermeulen () and Romano (), this case shows that firms do
engage in regulatory arbitrage across Europe. Companies responded to
deregulation by relocating their headquarters abroad. ‘ Investment flight’
towards the UK and Luxembourg was high. Because licences were valid
in EU Member States, the largest players in Europe chose to base satellite
services in these two states. The number of channels licensed in the UK
has topped .
In contrast to previous studies on regulatory competition in the EU
(Bratton, McCahery, and Picciotto; Vogel; Eichener; Joerges and Neyer;
and Heritier), this study has shown that there is clear downward pressure
on national regulation. But this was not triggered by states or companies,
but driven by the EU institutions. When faced with regulatory arbitrage,
other Member States did not enter the game. There was no regulatory
race to the bottom. Rather states challenged the circumvention of
national rules in the Court of Justice. The ECJ ruled consistently against
Member States, thereby reinforcing deregulation of national rules. This
adds to Radaelli’s () recommendation to search for other variables
contributing to mechanisms of regulatory competition. The tenacity of
Member States to retain policy in this area is of course not only due to
concerns of cultural policy, but also due to political ties to domestic
media groups. This considered, the ECJ rulings were bold.
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There is no evidence of ‘ administrative supranationalism’ or upward
pressure on European regulation. Downward pressure has not been
superceded by European efforts to harmonise standards. The European
institutions have only encouraged downward pressure on regulation
based on the political mandate set out in the Single Market programme.
It is precisely those rules established in EU Directives and Regulations
which are the most subject to competition. European legislation was not
designed by the European Commission, as in the case of the protection
of minors, to conserve and protect national rules on broadcasting – but to
open these rules to competition. Regulatory competition was the key aim
of the EU institutions.
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. ‘Television Without Frontiers’ Council Directive of  October  updated by Directive //EC
of .. amending Directive //EEC on the co-ordination of certain provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television
broadcasting activities.
. Rather than creating a public sector broadcaster for such a small population, Luxembourg had
instead licensed Europe’s first private radio broadcaster, Compagnie Luxembourgoise de Teledif-
fusion (CLT), in , which was later to become a major European player. Before ,
Luxembourg considered that regulation was inconsistent with its liberal approach and small market
size.
. Companies applying for broadcasting licences transmitted ‘ via low-power transmitters’ (to
Luxembourg) had to detail a complete list of their owners and directors, and managers. But less
transparency is required from non-domestic satellite broadcasters.
. SES, which owns the Astra satellites, became Luxembourg’s biggest tax contributor in  with a
input of LFr.bn in taxes. (‘ Survey-Luxembourg: Space age role for chateau’, Financial Times
 May ). Luxembourg Commissioners Jacques Santer and Vivien Reding were particularly
sensitive to the arguments of large media companies and domestic concerns were apparent during
key policy debates at the European level (for detail, see Harcourt ).
. The  TWF Directive does not stipulate whether or not the location of companies’ headquarters
are an indication of where they should be licensed. The UK lobbied to include this provision in the
revised  TWF.
. Sky bought BSB in  which had launched its own satellite Marco Polo with a domestic
satellite licence. The new company BSkyB therefore was broadcasting from both Astra and the UK
Marco Polo satellites. This contravened UK law, as the company had both a domestic and a
non-domestic satellite licence, and went against international satellite law as well. The issue was not
resolved until the  Satellite Television regulations and the  Television regulations since
which time there have no longer been ‘non-domestic satellite licences’ as such, merely ‘ satellite
licences’.
. The UK issues licences to companies not just within Europe, but all over the world. For example,
under this law one can purchase a UK licence for a channel broadcasting in Arabic to northern
Africa states from the Astra satellite Many licences for satellite broadcasters in Arab countries have
been issued in the UK (and also in France). This has led to the establishment of ‘media cities’ in
Cairo and Dubai which have attracted Arabic language broadcasters such as Orbit, MBC, Reuters
and CNN, which were originally operating from London (Guaaybess ).
. Procureur du Roi v Marc J.V.C. Debauve and others. Case / [] ECR   March .
. Article  of the Royal Decree of  December  (Moniteur Belge of  January ).
. Two previous cases dealing with the foreign transmission of advertising also ruled against Dutch
cable law: Case-/ Bond van Adverteerders [ECR , ] and Case C-/ Collectieve
Antennevoorziening Gouda [ECR I , ].
 Alison J. Harcourt
. Case C-/, Paul Denuit (TNT & Cartoon Network), Judgement of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities of  May .
. Joined cases Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Fo¨rlag AB (C-/) and
TV-Shop i Sverige AB.
. Opinion-Joined Cases E/ and E/, In a similar case to De Agostini the EFTA Court made
the same ruling. In Forbrukerombudet v.Mattel Scandinavia and Lego Norge, Judgment of  June
, the EFTA Court gave the opinion that Norway’s the Norwegian prohibition on television
advertisements specifically targeting children was incompatible with the Television Directive if it
applied the rules to a broadcaster established in another EEA State.
. Joined cases Radio Torre, Rete A Srl, Vallau Italiana Promomarket Srl, Radio Italia Solo Musica
Srl and Others, and GETE Srl (Appendix ).
. http://www.csa.fr/actualite/dossiers/dossiers_detail.php?id = &chap= .
REFERENCES
Bangemann Report () Europe and the global information society, Recommendations to the
European Council. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
Barnard, C. () Social Dumping and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the European
Union from Delaware, European Law Review, , , –.
Booz-Allen and Hamilton () Study on Pluralism and Concentration in Media-Economic
Evaluation. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
Bratton, W., McCahery, J., Picciotto, S. and Scott, C. () International Regulatory Competition and
Coordination: Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
British Screen Advisory Council (BSAC) () Digital Convergence-the British Screen Advisory Council View.
London: BSAC.
Bulmer, S. and Armstrong, K. () The Governance of the Single European Market. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Cary, W. () Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, Yale Law Journal, , ,
–.
Chalaby, J.K. () Transnational television in Europe: The role of pan-European channels, European
Journal of Communication, , , –.
Collins, R. () ‘Enter the Grecian horse? Regulation of foreign ownership of the media in the UK’,
Policy Studies, , , –.
Collins, R. and Murroni, C. () New Media New Policies. Institute for Public Policy Research.
Doyle, G. () Newspapers and UK media ownership controls, Journal of Media Law and Practice, ,
, –.
Eichener, V. () Effective European Problem-Solving. Lessons from the Regulation of Occupational
Safety and Environmental Protection, Journal of European Public Policy, , –.
Garnham, N. () Convergence of Broadcasting and Telecommunications, Communications policy
in Europe, in D. Elixmann and K. Heinz Neumann (eds.) Proceedings of the th Annual Communications
Policy Research Conference. London: Springer.
Garnham, N. () Telecommunications and Audio-visual convergence: Regulatory Issues. Luxembourg:
Commission of the European Communities.
Guaaybess, T. () A New Order of Information in the Arab Broadcasting System, European
University Institute Robert Schuman Centre working paper, , Florence.
Harcourt, A. () The Regulation of Media Markets in EU First-wave Accession States in Central
and Eastern Europe, European Law Journal, , , –.
Harcourt, A. () The European Union and the Regulation of Media Markets. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Heritier, A. () Market-making policy in Europe: its impact on member state policies. The case of
road haulage in Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, Journal of European Public Policy, , ;
–.
Hooper, R. () United Kingdom, Media Ownership and Control in the Age of Convergence. London:
International Institute of Communications.
Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. () Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving:
European comitology in the foodstuffs sector, Journal of European Public Policy, , , –.
Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. () From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes:
The Constitutionalization of Comitology, European Law Journal, , –.
Institution-driven Competition 
Korthals Altes, W.F. () European Law: A case study of changes in national broadcasting, Cardozo
Arts and Entertainment Review, , –.
Macleod, E. ()Media Ownership and Control in the Age of Convergence. New York: International Institute
of Communications.
Mastroianni, R. () ‘ La revisione della direttiva ‘ televisione senza frontiere’, Diritto delle radiodiﬀu-
sioni e delle telecomunicazioni, , –.
McCahery, J. and Vermeulen, E. () Does the European Company Prevent the ‘Delaware-effect’?,
European Law Journal, , , –.
Moffat, G. () European Integration and a Pension’s Problem: Coping with a Chameleon, in W.
Bratton, J. McCahery, S. Picciotto and C. Scott (eds.) International Regulatory Competition and
Coordination: Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
OECD (a) Telecommunications & Broadcasting: Convergence or Collision? Paris: OECD.
OECD (b) Convergence Between Communications Technologies: Case Studies from North America and Western
Europe. Paris: OECD.
OECD () Competition Policy and a Changing Broadcast Industry. Paris: OECD.
Padoa-Schioppa, T. et al. () Eﬃciency, Stability and Equity. Oxford: Oxford Unversity Press.
Paul, J. () Competitive and Non-competitive Regulatory Markets, in W. Bratton, J. McCahery, S.
Picciotto and C. Scott (eds.) International Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on Economic
Regulation in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. –.
Poullet, Y. () Convergence between media and telecommunications: towards a new regulatory
framework, Computer Law, , , –.
Prosser, T. () ‘ Self-regulation: Is ‘ ‘ Soft-law’’ sufficient?’ The Consumer, the European Union and
Media Law. March th , University of Exeter.
Puttnam, D. () Speech given at the conference Globalisation and Media Concentration: Threat to
Pluralistic Democracy. European Parliament: Brussels,  November.
Radaelli, C. () The Puzzle of Regulatory Competition, Journal of Public Policy, , , –.
Reich, R.B. () The Work of Nations. Preparing Ourselves for st-Century Capitalism. New York: Vintage
Books.
Romano, R. () Explaining American Exceptionalism in Corporate Law, in W. Bratton, J.
McCahery, S. Picciotto and C. Scott (eds.) International Regulatory Competition and Coordination:
Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. –.
Romano, R. () Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, , , –.
Sanches-Tabernero, A. () Media Concentration in Europe: Commercial Enterprise and the Public Interest.
Du¨sseldorf: European Institute for the Media.
Scharpf, F. () Community and autonomy: multi-level policy-making in the European Union,
Journal of European Public Policy, , , –.
Scharpf, F. () Introduction: the problem-solving capacity of multi-level governance, Journal of
European Public Policy, , , –.
Scott, C. () Institutional Competition and Coordination in the Process of Telecommunications
Liberalization, in W. Bratton, J. McCahery, S. Picciotto and C. Scott (eds.) International Regulatory
Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Stichting KijkOnderzoek () Annual report on the Dutch broadcast market. http://
www.kijkonderzoek.nl/.
Streeck, W. () Neo-voluntarism: a new social policy regime?, in Marks et al. (eds.) Governance in the
European Union. London: Sage Publications.
Streeck, W. () Industrial citizenship under regime competition: the case of the European works
councils, Journal of European Public Policy, , , –.
Sun, J. and Pelkmans, J. () Regulatory Competition in the Single Market, Journal of Common Market
Studies, , , –.
Veljanovski, C. (ed.) () Freedom in Broadcasting. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Vittet-Philip, P. () New Digital Services and the Information Society: contribution to a reﬂection in progress.
European Commission: Luxembourg.
Vogel, D. () Trading Up. Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. Harvard
University Press: Cambridge.
Vogel, D. () Trading up and governing across: transnational governance and environmental
protection, Journal of European Public Policy, , , –.
 Alison J. Harcourt
Voltmer, K. () Structures of Diversity of Press and Broadcasting Systems: The Institutional
Context of Public Communication in Western Democracies. WZB working paper, FS III –,
March.
Williams, G. () European Media Ownership: Threats on the Landscape. European Federation of
Journalists: Brussels.
Woolcock, S. () Competition Among Rules in the Single European Market, in W. Bratton, J.
McCahery, S. Picciotto and C. Scott (eds.) International Regulatory Competition and Coordination:
Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  . 
University of Exeter
Amory Building, Rennes Drive
Exeter EX RJ
e-mail: A.Harcourt@ex.ac.uk
Institution-driven Competition 
